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In 2012, Guida, Gobet, Tardieu and
Nicolas proposed a two-stage framework
to explain how cognitive changes due to
practice could shape experts’ brain physi-
ologically and thus explain neuroimaging
data of expertise acquisition. In this paper,
after presenting the motivations for such
a framework and the framework itself, we
examine the idea that functional cerebral
reorganization (FCR) could be used as a
signature for expertise.
CHUNKS, TEMPLATES AND RETRIEVAL
STRUCTURES
In the mid-nineties, Ericsson and Kintsch
(1995) and Gobet and Simon (1996) pro-
posed Long-Term Working Memory the-
ory (LTWMT) and Template Theory (TT),
respectively, in order to account for behav-
ioral data in the domain of expertise.
These data were difficult to explain with
the sole concept of chunk (Chase and
Simon, 1973), given the severe limita-
tions of working memory (WM) (7 ± 2
for an optimistic estimation, Miller, 1956;
but for recent reevaluations, see Cowan,
2001; Gobet and Clarkson, 2004; Mathy
and Feldman, 2012). For example, sev-
eral experiments (e.g., Charness, 1976;
Frey and Adesman, 1976; Glanzer et al.,
1984) showed that interfering tasks had
almost no effect on WM performance
or text comprehension with experts. Yet,
according to chunking theory (Chase and
Simon, 1973), interfering tasks should
wipe out the content of WM where infor-
mation is stored. This led Ericsson and
Kintsch (1995) and Gobet and Simon
(1996) to suggest that information was
not stored in WM as initially proposed,
but was rapidly and efficiently trans-
ferred in LTM, where the interfering
tasks has no effect. Both theories pro-
posed that this was possible only if
knowledge structures were built. These
structures were called templates with TT
and retrieval structures with LTWMT.
Even if differences exist between the
two theories (e.g., Ericsson and Kintsch,
2000; Gobet, 2000a,b), LTWMT and TT
revolve around the same fundamental
core idea: Fast and reliable transfer in
LTM becomes possible with expertise via
knowledge structures, which enables LTM
to be used during WM tasks, thus giv-
ing the appearance of expanding individ-
uals’ WM capacity. These two cognitive
theories have been used to explain not
only behavioral but also neuroscientific
data (e.g., Pesenti et al., 2001; Ericsson,
2003; Campitelli et al., 2007; Bilalic´ et al.,
2010).
EXPLAINING NEUROIMAGING DATA IN
EXPERTISE ACQUISITION: A
TWO-STAGE FRAMEWORK
Recently, the core idea of the two theo-
ries has been used by Guida et al. (2012)
to bridge together, for the first time, (a)
neuroimaging data acquired from novice
undergoing practice in WM-related tasks
and (b) neuroimaging data acquired from
experts inWM-related tasks. The results of
the two groups of studies, which belong to
two separate domains of research, diverge.
Neuroimaging of novices practicing from
2 h up to 5 weeks show mainly a decrease
of activation in prefrontal and parietal
areas (for similar conclusions, see Kelly
and Garavan, 2005; Hill and Schneider,
2006; Buschkuehl et al., 2012). Conversely,
neuroimaging studies of experts who are
compared to novices are more compati-
ble with FCR, viz., experts and novices use
different brain areas and different men-
tal operations to perform similar tasks
(for similar conclusions, see Ericsson,
2003). Notwithstanding these divergent
findings (brain activation decrease vs.
FCR), the core idea behind LTMWT and
TT allows bridging these two neuroimag-
ing patterns into a coherent two-stage
framework.
FIRST STAGE: DECREASE OF
ACTIVATION DUE TO CHUNK
CREATION AND RETRIEVAL
When novices start practicing, and if the
activity is new, the first important process
is chunk creation. While executing their
new activity several times, novices will
start gradually chunking separate elements
together through binding, viz., encoding
the relations among stimuli that co-occur
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993). Once
chunks have been created and thus stored
in LTM, chunk can be retrieved and there-
fore used, allowing encoding multiple ele-
ments in WM with one chunk (e.g., “f,”
“b,” “i,” can be encoded as one element
in WM instead of three), using fewer
resources.
At a physiological level, chunk creation
(through binding) and chunk retrieval
are two reasons to expect brain activa-
tion decrease. First, if the binding process
occurs in prefrontal regions (Prabhakaran
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et al., 2000; Raffone and Wolters, 2001)
and in parietal regions (Shafritz et al.,
2002; Oakes et al., 2006), less activation
should be observed in these regions after
a period of training, because as training
progresses, fewer chunks will be created.
Second, the use of chunks through chunk
retrieval makes it possible to encode infor-
mation in WM with less resources, as
elements are grouped. Several researchers
have shown that, physiologically, there
is a correlation between the number of
elements in WM and brain activity in
prefrontal and parietal areas1 (Todd and
Marois, 2004; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004;
Cowan, 2011). Therefore, if less WM space
is used through chunk retrieval, decrease
of brain activity should be expected
in prefrontal and parietal WM areas
(Figure 1).
1It is particularly the case in the intra-parietal sulcus
(e.g., Majerus et al., 2010; Cowan et al., 2011).
SECOND STAGE: FUNCTIONAL
CEREBRAL REORGANIZATION DUE TO
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES CREATION
AND RETRIEVAL
With practice (e.g., Cowan et al., 2004;
Chen and Cowan, 2005) and expertise
(e.g., Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and
Simon, 1996), chunks get larger and more
complex, and with years of training they
become knowledge structures. For experts,
the peculiarity of these structures, when
used in their domain of expertise, is
to allow rapid and reliable encoding in
episodic LTM, even inWM-like conditions
(fast presentation times of multiple ele-
ments) when usually elements can only be
encoded reliably in WM (Figure 1).
In terms of brain activation, at this
stage, not only a cerebral activation pat-
tern compatible with WM activities is
expected but conjunctly a pattern com-
patible with episodic LTM, that is, medial
temporal lobe (MTL) activations (Gabrieli
et al., 1997; Young et al., 1997; Lepage
et al., 1998; for reviews, see Squire et al.,
2004; Eichenbaum et al., 2007) due to the
utilization of knowledge structures. From
a longitudinal standpoint, this implies a
FCR, which can be defined by two changes
occurring with practice: (a) the decrease
of brain activity undergirding cognitive
processes that are used less with prac-
tice (here WM in stage 1), and (b) the
emergence of brain activity in new areas
supporting new cognitive processes (here
episodic LTM in stage 2). Therefore, a
FCR involving episodic LTM2 is expected
(Figure 1). Unfortunately, to our knowl-
edge, nobody has followed the develop-
ment of expertise in a WM-related task
with neuroimaging long enough to test
2FCR, in this article, means, a shift of a way of per-
forming a task to another way, without specifying the
new way. FCR involving episodic LTM, in this arti-
cle, means that the new way of performing the task
is through episodic LTM
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the Two-Stage Framework
linking the cognitive and cerebral levels in expertise acquisition,
through two examples. The “Examples” section shows the evolution of
the effect of knowledge on how items to-be-remembered are processed:
at first, items are processed almost separately, later, items are regrouped
in chunks, and finally in knowledge structures, which can be viewed as
super-chunks that regroup multiple chunks into a high-level pattern. In the
“Cerebral Level” section, the representation of brain activity is at an
ordinal scale. SST stands for statistical significance threshold; if brain
activity is beneath this threshold, it goes undetected. PFC stands for
prefrontal cortex, PL for parietal lobe, and MTL for medial temporal lobe.
The first MTL activity on the left is almost at the same level than the
statistical significance threshold in order to indicate that for novices, brain
activity is sometimes detected (see section “Concluding Remarks”). For
novices, detection seems to vary according to the kind of experimental
paradigm, the parameters and maybe the participants of the experiments.
If one considers that the MTL activity is above the statistical significance
threshold for novices then functional cerebral reorganization is better
suited to describe expertise acquisition; if it is beneath, then functional
cerebral redistribution is better suited.
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this hypothesis. Instead, what is possible is
to compare novices against experts. This
was the aim of Guida et al.’s (2012) review,
which showed that most of the studies
were compatible with FCR involving LTM.
FUNCTIONAL CEREBRAL
REORGANIZATION: A SIGNATURE OF
EXPERTISE?
Given that a link has been established
between expertise and FCR, an important
question is to know whether FCR could be
used as a signature for expertise. A simple
way to answer this question is to exam-
ine empirically whether the implication
“expertise thus FCR” observed by Guida
et al. (2012) could be reversed. In other
words, when one looks for patterns com-
patible with FCR—viz. a decrease of brain
activity concerning one cognitive process
and the emergence of brain activity con-
cerning new cognitive processes—is exper-
tise found? If it is not the case then FCR
does not imply expertise.
At first glance, this does not seem to be
true. There are multiple examples show-
ing that the simple utilization of different
strategies can involve patterns of activa-
tion similar to FCR. For instance, the lit-
erature of WM-related tasks shows that
when different groups of individuals use
spontaneously different strategies—verbal
strategy vs. visual strategy (Burbaud et al.,
2000), or verbal strategy vs. spatial strategy
(Glabus et al., 2003)—then completely dif-
ferent patterns of activation are detected.
This seems to be true even when the
strategies are dictated by the experimenter,
as observed by Bernstein et al. (2002)
when imposing different encoding strate-
gies in a task of face recognition. These
three between-subject studies bring only
indirect evidence, but they are confirmed
by a within-subject study. When Reichle
et al. (2000) asked the same individuals
to process a sentence-picture verification
task with different strategies (linguistic vs.
visual), completely different patterns of
activity appeared: there was a decrease of
brain activity concerning cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g., linguistic) and the emergence
of brain activity concerning new cognitive
processes (e.g., visual). In all these cases,
a pattern consistent with FCR is present
but no expertise is found. Therefore, the
implication “expertise thus FCR” does not
seem reversible.
However, when considering precisely
FCR involving episodic LTM areas, the
picture is different. First, we found only
one study (Kondo et al., 2005); secondly, it
is the only study where participants were
taught how to use knowledge structures.
Kondo et al. (2005) asked their novice
participants to encode ten object pictures
using the method of loci, basing them-
selves on the visuospatial knowledge of
their house. When comparing neuroimag-
ing before and after using the method
of loci, they observed a pattern consis-
tent with FCR at retrieval. Hence, if one
argues that the method of loci is based on
the utilization of expertise (Guida et al.,
2009, 2013), the conclusion from Kondo
et al. (2005) could be that for FCR involv-
ing episodic LTM areas, the implication
“expertise thus FCR” can be reversed,
making the proposal that FCR is a signa-
ture for expertise verisimilar (when involv-
ing episodic LTM).
However, when trying to relate
expertise and FCR and before one can
be conclusive on the link between these
two concepts, two elements need to be
taken into consideration, functional cere-
bral redistribution and brain connectivity.
These will constitute our concluding
remarks.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A very recent growing body of data sug-
gests that in some cases, functional cere-
bral redistribution could also occur with
practice. Both FCR and functional cerebral
redistribution involve a combination of
increases and decreases in activation (Kelly
and Garavan, 2005); however, only FCR
necessitates the emergence of new areas
with practice. Recent evidence suggests
that MTL could also be involved in WM
tasks with no practice (e.g., Ranganath
and Blumenfeld, 2005; Olson et al., 2006;
Lee and Rudebeck, 2010; Campo et al.,
2013). The debate is still ongoing and these
results are considered artifactual by some,
mainly because the tasks used seem more
LTM-like than WM-like (Jonides et al.,
2008). Squire and Wixted (2011) observed
that if WM capacity were not exceeded,
MTL was not involved (e.g., Shrager et al.,
2008; Jeneson et al., 2012). Nonetheless,
these data suggest that in some cases, MTL
activation could be expected at the early
stages of training. It is plausible that this
activation could increase with expertise
when knowledge structures are available,
which means that this pattern would be
better described by functional redistribu-
tion than FCR, because this last pattern
implies no MTL activation at the initial
stage of practice (Figure 1). However, the
additional areas of experts are sometimes
the same structures than that of novices
but on the opposite hemisphere (e.g.,
Bilalic´ et al., 2011, 2012), a.k.a. “double
take” phenomenon (e.g., Scalf et al., 2007),
which complicates sometime the distinc-
tion between functional redistribution and
FCR. To conclude concerning MTL, more
work needs to be done to ascertain its
involvement, especially in practice-related
studies where this kind of evidence is
scarce (but, see Dahlin et al., 2008), there-
fore, presently, these are only assumptions.
Finally, when considering expertise-
related FCR, which constitutes a com-
bined increase and decrease in activation
across the brain, it is also crucial to under-
stand how the different brain areas work
together in terms of network connectiv-
ity. Fundamental in this respect is the idea
of “neural context” proposed by McIntosh
(1998; also, see Bressler and McIntosh,
2007), according to which the frame of
activation (or the neural context of acti-
vation) around a determined brain area
is at least as important as the activation
of that brain area. If one relates this idea
to practice, then the consequence is that
even if the activation of a region does not
change with practice, it can still be cru-
cial, by influencing the increase or decrease
of activation in other brain areas (Kelly
and Garavan, 2005). The neural context
could thus be important for the study of
functional reorganization, and its applica-
tion should be disseminated (Bressler and
Menon, 2010).
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